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Abstract 
 
Firm productive performances in five Middle East and North African (MENA) economies and 
eight manufacturing industries are compared to those in 17 other developing countries.  
Although the broad picture hides some heterogeneity, enterprises in MENA often performed 
inadequately compared to MENA status of middle-income economies, with the exception of 
Morocco and, to some extent, Saudi Arabia. Firm competitiveness is a more constant constraint, 
with a unit labor cost higher than in most competitor countries, as well as investment climate 
(IC) deficiencies. The empirical analysis also points out how IC matters for firm productivity 
through the quality of infrastructure, the experience and education of the labor force, the cost 
and access to financing, and different dimensions of the government-business relationship. 
These findings bear important policy implications by showing which dimensions of the IC, in 
which industry, could help manufacturing in MENA to be more competitive in the globalization 
context.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The revival of interest in economic growth has renewed the question of the differences in 
productivity levels among countries and regions. Productivity, in the form of technical progress 
and technical efficiency, is actually seen as a potential, if not the major source of long-run 
economic growth and international convergence. A growing body of research has focused on 
manufacturing as a place of innovation and an engine of growth. Productivity in manufacturing is 
also central to international competitiveness, because developing countries face both increasing 
pressure of globalization and buoyant growth of the labor force. Understanding the factors that 
affect industrial performance bears important policy implications in MENA countries.1 Although 
theses economies are far from homogeneous in long-run performance, most of them have 
recorded results that are not in accordance with their middle-income economy status. This has 
been the situation for growth2 and investment,  with a limited capacity to diversify exports4 and 3
attract FDI,  for more than three decades. On average, MENA competitiveness has suffered from 5
insufficient economic reforms. In many countries, the common understanding of the situation is 
that international remittances and/or Dutch disease handicapped the diversification process and 
the emergence of efficient manufacturing sectors.6 But determinants besides relative prices 
played concomitantly, especially the business climate, which deficiencies have been reported to 
have affected productivity.   7
 
The World Bank Investment Climate (ICA) surveys collect data on inputs and outputs, and on 
various aspects of the institutional environment at the firm level. ICA surveys produce subjective 
evaluations of obstacles and other more objective information on infrastructure, human capital, 
technology, governance, and financial constraints. These standardized surveys of large and 
random samples of firms permit national and international comparisons of productive 
performance for different manufacturing sectors. They also provide information to estimate how 
the investment climate affects these performances. The ICA surveys are an adequate instrument 
for identifying how firm productivity and competitiveness can be improved. The objective of this 
paper is to help progress in that direction, especially in the MENA region.  
 
Drawing on World Bank firm surveys, we analyze the relationship between investment climate 
and firm productivity for the eight most significant manufacturing industries in 22 countries. Five 
of the countries are from MENA (see list of countries in Annex 1). By broadening the sample to a 
large number of countries, we compare MENA performance to that of emerging economies that 
are major competitors on the world market, especially China and India. Section II sheds light on 
different measures of productive performance and discusses their respective advantages and 
limits. We begin with simple measures of firm partial productivity levels and then move to 
stochastic production frontier analyses (SFA). SFA provides technical efficiencies equivalent in 
our context to relative total factor productivity (TFP) levels where labor and capital are 
considered together. By focusing more specifically on MENA enterprises, section III comments 
on the results. The broad picture hides some heterogeneity; but enterprises in several MENA 
countries have performed inadequately compared to MENA status of middle-income economies, 
except for Morocco and, to some extent, Saudi Arabia. Based on the literature, we then define, in 
section IV, the investment climate (IC) and present, in section V, MENA IC deficiencies. In 
section VI, these deficiencies are linked to productive performance. The SFA model 
incorporating inefficiency determinants is adopted, allowing a simultaneous estimation of both 
the production technology and the explanatory factors of inefficiencies. Econometric impacts are 
explored by considering factors on an individual basis and through composite indicators 
reflecting various dimensions of the IC. Section VII concludes with results and policy 
implications, for the MENA region in particular.  
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II. Measuring Productive Performance Across Firms  
 
Many options are available to appraise firm productivity, all of them having their own 
strengths and weaknesses. Partial labor productivity (LP), as defined by the ratio of the value 
added (Y) to the number of employees (L), is a common indicator. In the formula below i/j 
denotes the enterprise and country index, respectively. 
LP
 i, j = Y i, j /L i, j                  (1) 
 
Compared to alternative partial productivity measures, such as capital productivity, this ratio is 
less affected by the error in measurement of the denominator. Indeed, the capital stock refers to 
the value of machinery and equipment bought in different periods. Each transaction is accounted 
at the historical value. In addition, labor is the main productive input, generally contributing from 
40 percent to 80 percent of the value added (Y) according to the industrial sector we look at.  
Counterbalancing these advantages the LP ratio suffers some deficiencies.  
 
First, as with any partial productivity index, this indicator considers only one input and ignores 
the others. For a static analysis, the all things being equal principle looks embarrassing. Use of 
these partial indicators in the formulation of management and policy advice can be misleading, 
potentially resulting in an excessive use of those inputs not included in the efficiency measure. 
Second, the indicator can be biased by the choice of the exchange rate when converting 
production into US dollars. This is important in our framework where calculations are proposed 
for international comparison.  
 
Following previous remarks, all relevant inputs might be considered together. This objective 
can be achieved through parametric total factor productivity (TFP) analyses or by referring to the 
technical efficiency (TE) concept. In a dynamic analysis, TFP growth can be the result of a 
technical change or the consequence of a TE improvement. The former channel represents an 
upward shift of the production frontier, while the latter depicts a move within the feasible 
production set toward the frontier, the technology being unchanged. Within a static framework, 
TFP and TE levels can be used interchangeably. Indeed, TE is no more than a relative 
productivity level, all sample firms being benchmarked by those operating on the frontier (e.g., 
“best practice”). To determine how MENA organizations perform compared with their 
counterparts, the parametric technical efficiency concept looks particularly attractive; it accounts 
for random noise and then does not consider the whole residual as a TFP measure, which is the 
case in the Solow approach.  
 
The Cobb-Douglas technology is the most commonly used functional form, with properties on 
the production structure (e.g., elasticity of substitution equal to unity) that can be seen as 
restrictive. The translog technology is more flexible but generally suffers from a collinearity 
problem among the regressors. Correlations between inputs and/or their interactions make the 
interpretation of estimated coefficients less easy than the ones we get with the Cobb-Douglass 
functional form.  
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Estimation of the stochastic model relies on a two-component error term. The first component 
(v) is the classical random noise, which may reflect unpredictable variations in machine or labor 
performance. Such random noise potentially occurs in any firm, although certain industries are 
more prone to stochastic fluctuations than others. For example, the production of steel is highly 
dependent on the quality of power provision. It can be a systematic problem or a random one if 
power production is related to the impact of rains on dam levels. These shocks are supposed to be 
independent and identically distributed, following a normal distribution with a zero mean and a 
σ² standard deviation. The second term captures the technical inefficiency (-u) that may follow 
different statistical distributions. This u-term is an asymmetrically distributed negative error term 
reflecting the fact that firms lie on or below the stochastic production frontier. Distributional 
assumptions for the u-term do not necessarily have a significant influence on predicted 
inefficiencies (Coelli, Prasada Rao, and Battese, 1999). Any choice can be criticized and is not 
deprived of any arbitrariness. In the empirical work conducted, the Cobb-Douglass technology 
and the truncated normal distribution for the u-term are retained. This statistical law complies 
with the analysis of the inefficiency determinants, when using the Battese and Coelli (1995) 
model, which can be written as: 
 
iiii vuxfy +−= ),( β ;          (2) 
 
The production (y) is linked to inputs (x), with β the parameters to be estimated and i the firm 
index. For convenience, we keep the country index we used earlier for the partial productivity of 
labor (j). 
 
A complement to this analysis, which is of particular importance in our paper, is to determine 
the reasons firms are not necessarily efficient and some are far from “best practice.” Factors 
influencing this situation are numerous, and their respective impact can be tested by different 
methods. In the literature, one way to do this is to estimate the stochastic production frontier and 
to regress, in a second run, the obtained TE on a vector of explanatory factors (z). This “two-
step” procedure presents several shortcomings, including an identification problem. When any of 
the production frontier input (X) is influenced by common causes affecting efficiency, there is a 
simultaneity problem owing to omission of explanatory variables in the first stage of the 
estimation. The most recent literature proposes that the parameters of the equation (β, δ) be 
simultaneously estimated in a “one-step” procedure. Following this method the stochastic frontier 
model can be rewritten as: 
       
),(),( δβ iii ZUVii eXfY −=           (3) 
Yi is the output for the i-th firm and Xi the vector of inputs (K, L). The total error term is 
decomposed into the random noise (V) and the asymmetric error term U (Z, ), which depends 
on a vector of inefficiency determinants, the so-called z-factors that affect the inefficiency 
distribution denoted U ( Battese and Coelli, 1995): 
 
iii ZU ηδ += '          (4) 
),....,,1( 2' piii zzZ =  is the vector of the p-1 variables (zj) associated with inefficiency 
determinants. As mentioned above, iη  follows a truncated normal distribution and δ is a (1xp) 
vector of parameters to estimate.  
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III. Productive Performance of MENA Manufacturing Firms 
 
Table 1 shows, by country and industry, the averages of firm labor productivity (LP) expressed 
in percentage of the country with the most performing firms.8 The analysis reveals a relatively 
stable ranking of countries across industries. On average, South African and Brazilian firms 
perform best. This result is consistent with the relatively high GDP per capita in the two 
countries 
(3,530 and 2,788 US dollars in 2003 respectively, see World Bank, 2005). Moroccan firms 
also are among the best performers of the sample, along with Saudi Arabia in the three industries 
covered by the survey, both ahead from the two Asian giants (China and India). The Moroccan 
performance is the most remarkable, considering its relatively low level of income (1,477 US 
dollars GDP per capita in 2003) compared to the two leader countries. The Saudi Arabian 
performance, however, looks more disappointing when contrasted with its status of high-middle 
income economy (8,366 US dollars GDP per capita in 2003). As far as the other MENA countries 
are concerned, the ranking also remains rather stable across industries. Egyptian and Lebanese 
firms are systematically among the worst performers, although Egypt exhibits a rather similar 
level of GDP per capita to Morocco (1,220 US dollars in 2003) and Lebanon a higher one than 
South Africa and Brazil (4,224 US dollars in 2003). In Algeria, firm productivity of labor (LP) 
ranks at a low-intermediate position, close to India in Agro-Processing and Chemical & 
Pharmaceutical Products, but behind in Textile and Metal & Machinery Products (firm 
performances are, in any case, always lower than in China). Algeria’s GDP per capita (2,073 US 
dollars in 2003) is higher than Morocco’s.   
 
The partial labor productivity of some MENA countries does not mean, however, that the 
labor cost of this region is not competitive and does not support the integration of manufacturing 
sectors into the world economy. The story is more complicated, as average wages (e.g., ratio of 
total wages to the number of firm employees) that represents the nominal remuneration of the 
labor input can be in line with its productive performance. By combining all the relevant 
information, the relative unit labor cost (ULC) gives a better idea of sector-based 
competitiveness. In MENA, this cost is one of the highest of our empirical sample (Table 2). This 
is particularly true in Algeria and Egypt— countries where firm productive performance of labor 
(LP) is among the lowest—but also in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and, to some extent, Lebanon. In 
MENA, the ULC tends to be higher than in the majority of Asian economies (India, China, Sri 
Lanka, Bangladesh, and Thailand). In China and India, salaries (around 100 US dollars per month 
for unskilled workers) are far lower than in Morocco (more than double). In the labor-intensive 
sectors of Textile and Garment, the cost of labor is two to two and a half times higher in Egypt 
and Morocco than in India. This situation constitutes a serious handicap for MENA 
competiveness, which suffers from both faster technological innovations and lower wages in 
Asia. 
 
Table 1 - Firm-Level Relative Productivity of Labor  
 
In Table 3, we move to the TE concept and then take into account all the relevant inputs 
participating in the production process. Industry-based efficiencies are estimated under the 
reasonable assumption that a homogenous technology exists across all firms of the same industry. 
Differences in coefficients of capital and labor have justified this choice, against an alternative 
assumption where the same production frontier would be hypothesized across all industries, with 
only industry-based fixed effects to differentiate them.9 The same hypotheses and definitions as 
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before have applied to input and output variables.10 As for productivity of labor, results are 
presented by country and industry in percentage of the average TE of the best-performing 
country.  
 
Table 2 - Firm-Level Relative Unit Labor Costs 
 
In average, TE results are close to the ones obtained for productivity of labor. The ranking of 
countries remains broadly unchanged, with South Africa and Brazil having (in most industries) 
the best-performing firms. These countries are again followed by Morocco and Saudi Arabia. 
Only in Garment and Leather, are Moroccan firms surpassed by Thailand and Ecuador, 
respectively. As far as other MENA countries are concerned, Egypt and Lebanon still rank at the 
bottom of the sample (with a very limited number of enterprises for the latter country), and 
Algeria is at a low intermediate position. Technical efficiency calculations thus confirm the 
relatively poor productive performance of firms in several MENA countries, in contrast to 
MENA status of middle-income economies, as well as the relative heterogeneity of our MENA 
sample.11  
 
 
Table 3 - Firm-Level Technical Efficiency 
 
These relative poor achievements are also confirmed when comparing MENA average firms’ 
performance to the one in the non MENA zone of our sample. This is done in Table 4 for Labor 
Productivity (LP), Unit Labor Cost (ULC) and Technical Efficiency (TE). Table 4 clearly shows 
that firms in MENA have in average performed less satisfactorily than in the non MENA area for 
most indicators and in most industries. Interestingly, it is in Textile and Leather that firms’ 
realizations are the most problematic, with low achievements in all indicators. This fragility is all 
the more damageable for the MENA region, knowing the high specialization of some MENA 
countries (Morocco and Egypt in particular) and exposure to international competition of firms in 
these industries. As for the other industries, when differences in LP between the MENA and the 
non MENA region are not significant, firms’ competitiveness is handicapped by high ULC. This 
is the case in Metal & Machinery Products, Chemical & Pharmaceutical Products and Wood & 
Furniture. In only one sector: Agro Industry, there is no significant difference between MENA 
and non MENA for LP and ULC. As regard TE, MENA firms demonstrate more technical 
inefficiency in all industries but Garment and Chemical & Pharmaceutical Products. To some 
extent these inefficiencies are related to investment climate that is explored further. But the 
heterogeneity of MENA economies, as well as the small size of the control group call for 
cautious interpretations of our results. 
 
 
Table 4 – MENA/ Non MENA Firm-Level Relative Productivity of Labor, Unit Labor 
Costs and Technical Efficiency (Average) 
 
IV. Measuring the Investment Climate  
 
Recent developments in the economic literature have put the investment climate at the center 
of economic performance. It is now well documented that the investment climate can 
significantly affect investment, productivity, and growth,12 thus conditioning the success of 
market-based economies.13 Many empirical studies have first relied on cross-country analysis, to 
link governance and institutions to economic performance at the macroeconomic level.14 More 
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recently, the literature has evaluated firm performance and its determinants using enterprises 
survey data15. This approach, still quite new, intends to strengthen the institutional literature by 
providing microeconomic foundation and generating policy recommendations based on the 
identification of the main constraints faced by firms.  
 
The investment climate is defined by the World Bank (2004) as the policy, institutional, and 
regulatory environment in which firms operate. A main hypothesis in the literature is that IC 
affects particularly activity through the incentive to invest. Improving the IC reduces the cost of 
doing business and leads to higher and more certain returns on investment. It also creates new 
opportunities (for example, through trade or access to new technology) and puts competitive 
pressure on firms. The World Bank (2004) reports, as well, that a better investment climate 
contributes to the effective delivery of public goods necessary for productive business. The 
deficiencies of the investment climate are also seen as barriers to entry, exit, and competition. A 
short review, in Annex 2, presents the main justifications and findings of the literature for 
different dimensions of IC. 
 
The World Bank Investment Climate (ICA) surveys classify the information on the business 
environment in six broad categories.16 Because of data limitations, we have focused the 
investigation on four dimensions: Quality of Infrastructure (Infra), Business-Government 
Relations (Gov)17, Financing Constraints (Finance), and Human Capacity (Human).18 This 
categorization has the advantage of respecting different axes of investigation developed in the 
literature (Annex 2) and synthesizing most of the information given in the surveys. Annex 3 is a 
detailed list of variables in this classification.  
 
Although most of the empirical literature relies on individual variables to capture the different 
dimensions of the investment climate, few authors have shown interest in substituting aggregate 
measures for individual variables.19 When multiple indicators cover a similar theme, the 
correlation between them is quite high. The solution of restricting the analysis to a limited 
number of indicators has the disadvantage of accepting a potential omitted variable bias. This 
option also poses the question whether the selected variables provide a representative description 
of the investment climate or not. The solution of using composite indicators has the advantage of 
obtaining more accurate estimates, in addition to including more dimensions of the IC.  
 
In our empirical analysis, both individual variables and aggregated indicators have been 
considered (section VI). Although different methods of aggregation exist, the principal 
component analysis (PCA) aggregates basic indicators in a more rigorous way than a subjective 
scoring system does.20 The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) methodology is a widely used 
aggregation technique, designed to linearly transform a set of initial variables into a new set of 
uncorrelated components, which account for all of the variance in the original variables. Each 
component corresponds to a virtual axe on which the data are projected. The earlier component 
explains more of the variance of the series than do the later component. The number of 
components is proportional to the number of initial variables that are used in the PCA. Usually, 
only the first components are retrained, because they explain most of the variance in the dataset. 
The cumulative R²gives the explanatory power of the cumulative components. 
 
Based on the above-mentioned classifications, we have generated four aggregated indicators at 
the branch level, defining in each country the specific investment climate of each industry. This 
has produced 32 aggregated indicators (four indicators for each of the eight industries). Our 
initial indicators were selected because they are available for as many countries as possible and 
because they capture the different key dimensions of the IC. Besides, we have tried to complete, 
  
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.26 
 
10 
 
as much as possible, the qualitative (perception-based) IC indicators with quantitative 
information, to get a better picture of the investment climate in each industry. The analysis 
usually treats the IC indicators as exogenous determinants of firm performance. However, this is 
not always the case.21 To address this issue, we have measured IC variables as city-sector 
averages of firm-level observations, as in Dollar (2005). This has helped, as well, to increase the 
number of observations, by integrating in the sample firms for which information was 
insufficient. This has been done for Infrastructure and Business-Government Relations. For 
Human Capacity and Financing Constraints, however, the initial indicators have been interpreted 
as specific to each firm, and the information has been kept at the firm level (except for the 
variable Skill and Education of Available Workers).  
 
After extracting the principal components of the initial variables, the four composite indicators 
were constructed as the weighted sum of two or three principal components, depending on the 
explanatory power of each component. We chose the most significant principal components 
whose eighenvalues were higher than one. In this case, we explain around 70 percent of the 
variance of the underlying individual indicators. The weight attributed to each principal 
component corresponds to its relative contribution to the variance of the initial indicators 
(calculated from the cumulative R²). The contribution of each individual indicator to the 
composite indicator can then been computed as a linear combination of the weights associated 
with the two or three principal components and of the loadings of the individual indicators on 
each principal component 22. 
 
V. MENA Investment Climate  
 
Table 5 summarizes the value of MENA IC individual variables entering our four aggregated 
indicators. Average deficient investment climate must have contributed to the disappointing 
productive performance of several MENA countries. When compared to the rest of the sample, 
MENA tends to fall behind in most areas. This is true for all dimensions of Financing 
Constraints and most dimensions of Human Capacity and Government-Business relations. 
MENA's deficient financial system contributes to firm difficulties in getting credit and is an 
important aspect often emphasized in the literature. With public banks dominating the banking 
system and favoring state enterprises, large industrial firms, and offshore enterprises in many 
countries, small and medium-size firms find it difficult to get the startup and operating capital 
they need (Nabli, 2007). This is also the case for limitations of various dimensions of the 
government-business environment and for lack of training and expertise in the labor force. Doing 
Business (2005–2009) for example ranks MENA particularly low on labor market, enforcing 
contracts, construction permits, starting and closing a business, protecting investors, in addition 
to getting credit (World Bank, 2009a). Nabli (2007) also emphasizes MENA’s above-average 
number of licenses, domestic taxation, import duties, regulatory and administrative barriers to 
firm start up and operations, and weaknesses in infrastructure and the financial system.23 The 
World Bank (2009a and b) points that MENA has globally failed to keep pace with reforms and 
ranks in the bottom third worldwide as far as business climate is concerned, lower than any other 
region in the world. This is also true, in average, for various aspects of public governance (see 
World Bank, 2005 and Aysan et al., 2007).  
 
Table 5- Investment Climate and Firm Characteristics  
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Regarding the Quality of Infrastructure, our results are more mitigated than what is usually 
highlighted in the literature. If, on the one hand, firms in MENA seem, on average, to face more 
constraints in electricity delivery (more enterprises rely on their own generator), as well as in 
internet connection, on the other hand, telecommunications, and transport networks do not appear 
as very strong obstacles to firm operation. These differences may be due to our small number of 
MENA countries and to the presence in the sample of Morocco and Saudi Arabia, whose 
infrastructures are more in line with the level of development of their economies. Actually, the 
literature reveals differences across countries in various aspects of the IC. In our sample for 
example, it is Morocco who seems to suffer the least from IC limitation. Except from financing, 
other aspects of the IC do not appear as high constraint (see Morocco, 2001 and 2005). On the 
opposite, firms in Lebanon appear to face strong limitations, in infrastructures and business-
government relation in particular (World Bank, 2009a and b). As for Egypt and Saudi Arabia, 
firms seem to deal with an intermediate situation, with relatively high deficiencies in various 
aspects of the business-government relation, in Egypt in particular (see World Bank, 2009a and 
b; Egypt, 2001 and 2005). Interestingly, these outcomes are in line with our findings on firm’s 
productive performances. Finally, Table 5 also shows the average smaller firm size and export 
capacity of the MENA region.   
 
 
VI. MENA and the Explanation of Technical Efficiency 
 
Equation (3) in section II incorporates firm technical inefficiencies determinants by 
considering, besides the logarithm of the production factors (capital k and labor l), various plant 
characteristics (Size, Foreign, Export) and IC individual variables. The IC variables retained 
participate in the four axes we discussed earlier. Their number has, however, been limited by 
problems of multicolinearity. To address endogeneity,  the city or region averages have been 
considered for electricity delivery (RegElect), access to the Internet (RegWeb), access to 
financing (RegAccessF), labor regulation (RegLreg), and corruption (RegCorrup). We use the 
same methodology adopted by Dollar (2005). The other individual variables: overdraft facility 
(Cred), level of education (EduM) or experience (ExpM) of the top manager, and training of 
workers (Training) are regarded as specific to each firm; the identification of their impact does 
not pose econometric problems.   
 
As for the control variables, the level of exports (Export, in percent of firm sales) is included in 
the regressions because exporting is a learning process, which enables companies to improve 
productivity by learning from customers and by facing international competition.24 Likewise, 
foreign ownership (Foreign, in percent of firm capital) may increase productivity if foreign 
investors bring new technologies and management techniques.25 As for the size (Size), we intend 
to test the hypotheses of scales economies and increasing returns to scale in large enterprises.26  
 
Equations have been estimated on unbalanced panels, going from 380 observations (in 
Leather) to 1601 observations (in Garment), depending on the industry. The results of the 
regressions confirm the choice to estimate a production frontier by industry. Elasticities of capital 
and labor are different from one industry to another (Table 6).27 Coefficients of the technology 
are highly statistically significant and close to the constant returns to scale. Some differences in 
production frontiers can be explained by invariant country-specific conditions incorporated at the 
level of the technology through country-dummy variables. Although these dummies are not given 
with the regression results, they have been considered and proved to be statistically significant.  
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More interestingly, our estimations do not reject that differences in the investment climate 
participate in firm TE discrepancies. This is true for all aspects of the IC, except for Government-
Business relations. This finding confirms that good quality infrastructure (proxied by the quality 
of the electric network and the availability of Internet access), satisfactory access to financing, 
and availability of expertise at the firm level (such as education level and experience of the 
manager and training of the employees) are important factors for the enterprise’s productive 
performance. This outcome is consistent with the empirical literature.   
This finding appears, however, quite different from one industry to another. First, as expected, 
it looks like the estimations have suffered from the collinearity of several IC variables. In fact, 
although each broad category of IC variables (except Government-Business relations) ends up 
being significant in almost all industries, it is rare to find two significant IC variables in the same 
category.28 Besides, in an interesting turn, Textile and Metal & Machinery Products look more 
sensitive to IC deficiencies than other industries. In these two sectors also, firm performance 
depends on more dimensions of the IC. This finding may be explained by greater exposure of 
these industries to international competition and thus their need for a supportive investment 
climate to help them compete efficiently.  
 
As for Business-Government relations, neither labor regulations (RegLreg), nor corruption 
(RegCorrup) emerge as obstacles to firm productive performance, although this outcome should 
be viewed with caution because of the potential  correlation between explanatory variables. 
Difficulties have also occurred in validating the impact of other individual variables. Firm size 
(Size) and foreign ownership of capital (Foreign) justify scale economies and externalities linked 
to participation of foreign capital in just two sectors: Agro-Processing and Chemical & 
Pharmaceutical Products, which are industries where foreign companies can be present. Export 
orientation (Export) appears as a determinant of productivity only in one sector: Garment, what 
corresponds to what we know about this sector, where external competitive markets and flexible 
partnership with foreign companies stimulate sources for a high productivity level. Identically, 
regression results are poor in two sectors: Leather and Wood & Furniture.29  
 
Table 6 - Estimation Results: Common Model with Individual IC Variables 
. 
 
The difficulty in estimating separately the productive impact of the IC and other control 
variables can partly be due to multicolinearity problems. As a result, an extension of the 
empirical work has been replacing individual factors with the four IC composite indicators: 
Quality of Infrastructure (Infra), Business-Government relations (Gov), Human Capacity 
(Human), and Financing Constraints (Finance). Results by industry of this new set of estimations 
confirm this hypothesis and our previous findings (Table 7). Production frontiers are robust to the 
introduction of different IC variables, with few changes in the returns to scale and elasticities of 
production factors across industries. The countries’ specific conditions are also validated by the 
data. As far as the investment climate, the four dimensions are now significant with the expected 
sign. Besides, our model validates the impact of a much more substantial number of IC variables 
incorporated in the aggregated indicators. This result is all the more important for the MENA 
region, where an improvement of different dimensions of the investment climate could contribute 
to firm efficiency and the regional catch-up with more efficient and competitive economies. 
Improving Financial Environment, Government-Business relations, and Human Capacity, in line 
with the region deficiencies (see Table 5 in section V on MENA IC limitations), would certainly 
go in that direction.   
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The findings by industry also bring quite interesting comments. Our empirical analysis reveals 
that some industries: Textile (for Human, Infra, and Finance), Metal & Machinery Products (for 
Infra and Gov) and Wood & Furniture  (for Human and Finance), appear more sensitive and 
vulnerable than others in a poor investment climate. This comment may be extended to Nonmetal 
& Plastic Materials and Garment for, respectively, Infrastructure and Government-Business 
relations. Interestingly, firms in these industries, except in Garment, have in average been found 
less efficient in MENA than in the non MENA sample (see section III). These findings also 
confirm, in a different way, some conclusions of the previous model. As mentioned before, this 
result may be because most of these industries face international competition. As well, it looks 
like that heavy industries (Metal & Machinery Products, Nonmetal & Plastic Materials), are 
more sensitive to infrastructure deficiencies than others, what constitutes an intuitive result too. 
This fragility justifies special attention when making decisions that may affect the investment 
climate in these sectors. This also means that the payoff of an improvement of the investment 
climate would be more substantial in these industries.30 This conclusion is all the more important 
for MENA, where an improvement of the investment climate would greatly help industrial 
diversification and export strengthening in these sectors characterized by a low efficiency. This 
finding is particularly true for Textile and Garment, notably in countries like Morocco and Egypt 
where the specialization in these products is high. Enhancing the investment climate in these two 
industries would contribute to resisting strong international competition and reinforcing the 
export orientation of more countries in the region as well. More research on industry-
particularities would, however, be needed for further comments of the results.  
 
Regarding firm characteristics, Size suggests potential scale economies in four industries 
instead of two with the individual factor-based models (e.g., Wood and Furniture, and Leather in 
addition to Agro-Processing and Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Products). In a context of 
growing competition, this result supports a concentration process of small organizations. This 
finding is particularly useful for the MENA countries, where firms are of relative small size 
(Table 5). Besides, export orientation (Export) explains externalities linked to export activities in 
Leather in addition to Garment, confirming the exposure to international competition of these 
two industries. The increase in export capacity of some industries is another means to stimulate 
firm technical efficiency and to promote a diversified economic growth process, where industry 
plays a major role. The implication for MENA again is straightforward, knowing the weak 
manufacturing export capacity of the region. A policy favoring exports would contribute to 
productivity gains and strengthening of the manufacturing sector of many countries in the 
region31.  
 
 
Table 7 - Estimation Results: Common Model with Aggregated IC Variables 
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VII. Conclusions 
 
Although the picture hides some heterogeneity, enterprises in MENA have tended to perform 
inadequately in contrast to MENA status of middle income economies. This is true for labor 
productivity (LP) and technical efficiency (TE) in Egypt, Lebanon and to some extent Algeria, 
compared to a broad sample of firms from eight industries in 22 developing countries. The 
exception is Morocco and, to some extent, Saudi Arabia, where firms match the most productive 
performances. Average low performances of MENA countries have been linked to deficiencies in 
the investment climate that handicap manufacturing competitiveness. Differences in the quality 
of various infrastructures, the experience and level of education of the labor force, the cost and 
access to financing, and several dimensions of government-business relations have explained 
firm performance discrepancies. Results are stronger than those usually found in the literature 
because of the large number of countries, manufacturing branches and indicators of investment 
climate on which our analysis relied. These findings support the idea that a deficient investment 
climate can be at the origin of a loss of domestic and international competitiveness, and of export 
capacities. Therefore, enhancing the investment climate is a powerful engine of take-off in the 
manufacturing. These results are an important means of understanding the positive impact of an 
improvement of the MENA investment climate, because the region suffers from deficient 
industrial diversification and integration into world markets. 
 
Our findings allowed, moreover, the identification of industrial sectors where technical 
efficiency suffers particularly from investment climate limitations. This is the case of heavy 
industries like Metal & Machinery Products and Nonmetal & Plastic Material, for infrastructure 
especially, as well as sectors more exposed to international competition such as Textile and 
Garment. Improvement of various dimensions of the investment climate (depending on the 
sectors) would show a comparatively stronger impact in these industries, which could play a 
leading role in the development of an efficient manufacturing sector. These conclusions however 
call for more research on the subject of industry particularities. Moreover, our results showed that 
in some sectors. 
 
Ors, increasing the firms’ size and, to a lesser extent, the export capacity, are other means to 
encourage a higher level of productive performance. This is particularly true for Leather, Agro-
Industry and Wood & Furniture, which are small-sized-firm sectors, as well as for Garment and 
Leather, which are more exposed to foreign competition.   
 
In fact, with the implementation of a broad economic reform agenda, MENA’s export-capacity 
strengthening and diversification is becoming a priority. Improving manufacturing productivity 
could thus be a powerful factor in economic growth, facilitating the long-run convergence 
process of the MENA region. Targeting reforms on small and medium-size enterprises, whose 
importance in MENA is high, and on those investment climate variables and industries that most 
favor productivity and competitiveness could, therefore, be an important element of MENA 
strategy of growth and employment in the future. Actually, like other developing countries, 
MENA economies are increasingly concerned about improving competitiveness and productivity, 
as the region faces the intensifying pressure of globalization. The World Bank firm surveys 
provide a standard instrument for identifying key obstacles to firm-level performance and 
prioritize policy reforms. This instrument can be used to boost competitiveness and diversify 
MENA economies in a context of an increasing external competition with big emergent countries 
such as China and India but also Brazil. 
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Annex 1. Countries of the Empirical Analysis 
 
Table A.1. List of Countries of the Sample  
 
MENA* LAC AFR SAS EAP 
Algeria  Brazil  Ethiopia  Bangladesh  China  
Egypt  Ecuador  South Africa  India  Philippines 
Morocco  El Salvador  Tanzania  Pakistan  Thailand  
Lebanon  Guatemala  Zambia  Sri Lanka   
Saudi Arabia Honduras     
 Nicaragua        
 
MENA: Middle East and North Africa; LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean; AFR: Sub-Saharan Africa; SAS: 
South Asia; EAS: East Asia.  
*Syria (2003) and Oman (2003) were removed from the sample because of a very low rate of answers to the 
questionnaire. 
 
 
 Annex 2. Investment Climate: the Main Findings of the Literature 
 
 
Quality of Public Services and Infrastructure Deficiencies 
 
In developing countries, infrastructure is a significant constraint to firm productivity and 
competitiveness (World Bank, 1994). Infrastructure is considered a complementary factor to 
other production inputs and stimulates private productivity by raising the profitability of 
investment.32 Infrastructure also increases productive performance by generating externalities 
across firms, industries, and regions.33 In the literature, energy emerges as a severe problem for 
firms in the poorest countries.34 Some authors also highlight that small firms, which rely more in 
public services, are particularly affected by infrastructure deficiencies (owing to scale economies 
in private provision of electricity and water in particular). 35  
  
Regression analyses confirm the harmfulness of infrastructure deficiencies on firm 
performance. At the macroeconomic level, Romp and De Haans (2005) find that public capital 
furthers economic growth. Escribano and Guash (2005), using enterprises surveys from three 
Central America countries, obtain a strong relationship between several of their 10 different 
measures of productivity and various IC variables (four are infrastructure indicators). Bastos and 
Nasir (2004) observe the same result for TFP in five Eastern and Central Asian countries, as well 
as Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae (2005) and Hallward-Driemeier and Wallsten 
(2006) for different firm performance (TFP, investment rate, sale, employment growth) in four 
Asian economies and China respectively. Reinikka and Svensonn (2002) confirm the negative 
impact of the number of days of power interruption on firm investment. Papers that find no 
significant effects of infrastructure on firm performance are a minority and have generally very 
specific sample or clear methodological limitations.36  
 
Financial Constraints 
 
In the literature, access to financing is associated with the ability of firms to finance investment 
projects. A developed financial system creates more investment opportunities and allocates 
resources to the most profitable ones (Levine, 2005). This leads to increased productivity through 
higher capital intensity and technical progress embodied in new equipment. Besides, financial 
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development has a positive effect on productivity as a result of higher technological 
specialization through diversification of risk. Cost and access to financing are reported as 
important constraints in developing countries. The World Bank (2004) indicates a high reported 
severity of the financial constraint in poorer countries. Carlin, Schafferand, and Seabright (2006) 
find the cost of finance ranked above average in severity in their country groups. Some authors 
find that smaller firms are more constrained than large ones.37  
 
Results in the empirical literature validate the importance of access to finance for firm 
economic performance. Carlin, Schafferand, and Seabright (2006) find a negative impact of  high 
cost of finance on firm output, in both between and within-country regressions. Aterido and 
Hallward-Driemeier (2007) show that a higher share of investment financed externally is 
associated with greater employment. Beck, Demirguc-kunt, and Maksimovi (2005) confirm that 
financial constraints affect particularly small firm employment and growth. Dollar (2006) 
highlights the link between access to finance and the probability to be an exporter38. By contrast, 
Commander and Svejnar (2007) do not show evidence of a link between the cost of finance and 
firm revenue for Eastern and Central Asian countries, and Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2006) do 
not show a link between bank access and firm performance in China.39. 
 
Corruption and Bureaucratic Quality  
 
Corruption has a clear adverse effect on the firm productive performance. This fact is well 
documented and often described as one of the major constraints facing enterprises in the 
developing world (World Bank, 2005). Carlin, Schafferand, and Seabright (2006) and Gelb, and 
others (2007) identify corruption as a problem reported primarily in less developed countries. 
Corruption increases the costs and the uncertainties about the timing and effects of the 
application of government regulations. Corruption also increases the investment and operational 
costs of public enterprises, which are detrimental to private investment through insufficient and 
low quality infrastructures (Tanzi and Davooli, 1997). The quality of administration is also part 
of the investment climate of the economy. Delay and inefficient delivery of services increase the 
cost of doing business. Low bureaucratic quality also increases operational costs of public 
enterprises (Evans and Rauch, 2000).  
 
At the macroeconomic level, Mauro (1995), in his cross-country analysis, shows that 
corruption reduces growth and Mo (2001) documents a causal chain through reduced human and 
physical capital. Likewise Evans and Rauch (2000) stress the role of bureaucratic quality. At the 
firm level, Escribano and Guash (2005) reveal a strong negative effect of red tape and corruption 
on productivity, and of rent predation (a combination of corruption and regulation). Aterido and 
Hallward-Driemeier (2007) demonstrate the negative relationship between various indicators of 
corruption and the growth of small, medium, and large firms. Fisman and Svensson (2005) 
investigate the relationship with bribery in Ugandan firms, and Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten, 
and Xu (2006) for Chinese firm sales.40 Beck, Demirguc-kunt, and Maksimovi (2005) do not 
confirm the impact of corruption on sales growth41.  
 
Competition, Taxation, and Regulation 
 
The view that competition promotes efficiency (Aghion and Griffith, 2005) leads us to expect a 
positive effect on firm performance and a negative one of excessive taxation and regulation. 
Taxation and regulation have a first order implication on costs and therefore productivity. 
Although government regulations and taxation are warranted, to protect the general public and 
generate revenues to finance the delivery of public services, overregulation and overtaxation 
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deter productive performance by raising business start-up and firm operating costs. Carlin, 
Schaffer, and Seabright (2006) show that anticompetitive practices are ranked greater than 
average importance in the 60 countries of their sample. Gelb and others (2007) see tax 
administration and labor regulation as problem respectively in middle and higher income 
countries.  
 
A number of studies have focused on cross-country variations to indentify the effect of labor 
regulation,42 regulation of entry,43 or a wide set of regulations44 on economic performance. These 
studies relate measures of regulation at the country level to aggregated country outcomes. At the 
firm level, Escribano and Guasch (2005) and Beck, Demirguc-kunt, and Maksimovi (2005) show 
a negative impact of various regulations on productivity, Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten, and Xu 
(2006) of the variable “senior management time in dealing with regulatory requirement” on sale 
and employment of Chinese enterprises.45 Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido (2007) highlight, 
however, that regulation can also have positive sides, especially if they are consistently 
enforced.46 On competition, Bastos and Nasir (2004) find a strongly positive and significant 
impact of this variable on productivity, and Commmander and Svejnar (2007) on firm revenue. 
 
 
Annex 3. Investment Climate Variables 
 
 
The Quality of Infrastructure (Infra) component is defined by five variables: obstacles (from 
none [0] to very severe [4]) for the operation of the enterprise caused by deficiencies in (a) 
Telecommunications, (b) Electricity, (c)Transport; (d) Presence of a firm generator; (e) 
Percentage of electricity coming from that source; (f) Possibility for the enterprise to access the 
Internet.  
 
The Government Business relations (Gov) axis includes three to six variables (depending on 
the industries): obstacle for the operation of the enterprise caused by (a) Tax Rate, (b) Tax 
Administration, (c) Customs and Trade Regulations, (d) Labor Regulation, (e) Business 
Licensing and Operating Permits, and (f) Corruption.  
 
The Financing Constraints dimension (Finance) consists of three variables: obstacles for the 
operation of the enterprise caused by: (a) Cost, (b) Access to Financing, and (c) Access to an 
Overdraft Facility or a Line of Credit.  
 
The Human Capacity (Human) component is represented by three to four variables: obstacle 
for the operation of the enterprise caused by deficient (a) Skill and Education of Available 
Workers, (b) Education, (c) Experience in number of years of the Top Manager, and (d) Training 
of the Firms’ Employees.  
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Table 1 - Firm-Level Relative Productivity of Labor  
(Country average, in % of the country with the most productive firms) 
 
Country* 
 
Textile 
 
Leather 
 
Garment 
 
Agro 
Processing 
 
Metal & 
Machinery 
Products 
Chemic 
& Pharm 
Products 
Wood 
& 
Furniture 
Non Metal 
& Plastic 
Materials 
South Africa 
(2003) 52  100 100 94 97 87 100 
Brazil (2003) 100 100 50 50 66 100 38  
Morocco (2004) 54 80 54 79 100 91  66 
Saudi Arabia 
(2005)    77 92  100  
Ecuador (2003) 58 91 80 48 50 54 42 66 
El Salvador 
(2003) 71 59 55 35 28 51  46 
China (2002) 52 69 45  31    
Thailand (2004) 62  62 45 40  31 43 
Guatemala 
(2003) 43  64 31 26 36 33 48 
India (2002) 35 66 53 21 22 17   
Honduras (2003) 56  50 29 23 39 21 26 
Pakistan (2002) 40 35 49 22  17   
Tanzania (2003)    35   20  
Philippines 
(2003) 32  32 14     
Algeria (2002) 27   21 19 19  31 
Bangladesh 
(2002) 18 53 16 9  11   
Nicaragua (2003) 13 38 26 17 13 17 16 21 
Sri Lanka (2004) 13  27 9 17   28 
Zambia (2002) 16   13 24 18   
Ethiopia (2002) 11 20 20 10   10  
Egypt  (2006) 14 15 14 12 16 11 10 13 
Lebanon (2006) 11  17 8   7  
Note: * Ranking is from countries with the most productive firms to the ones with the least productive firms.  Years of surveys 
are into brackets.  Source: World Bank, ICA database and authors’ estimations. 
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Table 2 - Firm-Level Relative Unit Labor Costs 
(Country average, % of the country with the highest unit cost) 
 
Country* 
 
Textile 
 
Leather 
 
Garment 
 
Agro 
Processing 
 
Metal & 
Machinery 
Products 
Chemic 
& Pharm 
Products 
Wood 
& 
Furniture 
Non Metal 
& Plastic 
Materials 
El Salvador 
(2003) 52 100 100 85 100 63  87 
Nicaragua 
(2003) 100 72 80 87 88 100 92 79 
Guatemala 
(2003) 64  83 100 79 87 89 74 
Algeria (2002) 73   89 89 96  100 
Philippines 
(2003) 66  92 83     
South Africa 
(2003) 86  97 74 80 88 69 64 
Morocco 2004) 81 79 91 75 75 76  60 
Honduras (2003) 36  78 88 76 63 96 86 
Egypt (2006) 60 86 76 71 46 80 92 51 
Saudi Arabia 
(2005)    89 59  55  
Lebanon (2006) 55  53 61   92  
Zambia (2002) 46   75 48 88   
Brazil (2003) 48 54 72 68 56 49 65  
Sri Lanka (2004) 86  64 71 39   32 
Bangladesh 
(2002) 49 34 60 69  55   
Ethiopia (2002) 71 25 45 56   55  
Ecuador (2003) 48 59 52 50 42 32 62 53 
Thailand (2004) 42  56 49 35  52 34 
China (2002) 39 41 54  38    
Pakistan (2002) 31 41 33 47  51   
India (2002) 32 27 35 42 35 44   
Tanzania (2003)    33   31  
Note : * Ranking is from countries with the most expensive labor to the ones with the least expensive one. Years of surveys are into 
brackets. Source: World Bank, ICA database, and authors’ estimations. 
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Table 3 - Firm-Level Technical Efficiency 
(Country average, in % of country with the most productive firms) 
 
Country* 
 
Textile 
 
Leather 
 
Garment 
 
Agro 
Processing 
 
Metal& 
Machinery 
Products 
Chemic 
& Pharm 
Products 
Wood 
& 
Furniture 
Non Metal 
& Plastic 
Materials 
South-Africa 
2003 85   100 100 100 89 100 100 
Brazil 2003 100 100 87 80 98 100 62   
Morocco 2004 58 70 81 70 100 72   92 
Saudi-Arabia 
2005       72 76   81   
Thailand 2004 64   93 67 65   47 66 
Ecuador 2003 57 86 61 61 63 60 57 63 
El Salvador 2003 40 62 65 58 55 63   66 
Guatemala 2003 51   77 45 57 45 48 67 
Honduras 2003 58   66 42 48 60 37 48 
India 2002 42 56 66 41 46 32     
Pakistan 2002 43 49 61 40   31     
China 2002 46 45 51   35       
Philippines 2003 36   53 39         
Algeria 2002 33     35 39 38   54 
Nicaragua 2003 22 55 41 34 38 30 31 49 
Tanzania 2003       43     32   
Zambia 2002 29     30 41 21     
Sri Lanka 2004 17   37 26 33     39 
Bangladesh 2002 24 41 32 28   19     
Ethiopia 2002 20 30 36 22     23   
Egypt 2006 17 15 22 22 25 14 19 24 
Lebanon 2006 21   23 16     13   
Note : * Ranking is from countries with the most productive firms to the ones with the least productive firms. Years of 
surveys are into brackets. Source: World Bank, ICA database, and authors’ estimations. 
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Table 4 – MENA/ Non MENA Firm-Level Relative Productivity of Labor, Unit Labor Costs and 
Technical Efficiency (Averages) 
 
 
 
 
Textile 
 
Leather 
 
Garment 
 
Agro 
Processing 
 
Metal & 
Machinery 
Products 
Chemic 
& Pharm 
Products 
Wood 
& 
Furniture 
Non Metal 
& Plastic 
Materials 
                                 Labor Productivity (LP) ( US dollars at current exchange rate) 
Non MENA 
10.08
*** 
6.80*
** 6.65* 14.9 16.0 18.5 7.5 11.1** 
MENA 7.93 4.91 4.96 15.2 15.6 18.6 7.3 8.8 
 
        
Unit Labor Costs (ULC) 
Non MENA 
0.37*
** 
0.46*
** 0.69 0.46 0.44** 0.33* 0.58** 0.54 
MENA 0.49 0.82 0.63 0.42 0.50 0.43 0.68 0.48 
 
        
Technical Efficiency (TE) 
Non MENA 
44.6*
* 
63.9*
** 62.3 44.5*** 60.6*** 40.8 
48.3**
* 61.6*** 
MENA 42.8 54.7 64.8 40.3 44.4 42.5 37.5 49.8 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations 
For labor Productivity (LP) and Technical Efficiency (TE), the mean comparison tests indicate that Non MENA is 
significantly higher than MENA at 10 %(*), 5%(**), and 1%(***). 
For Unit Labor Cost (ULC), the mean comparison tests indicate that Non MENA is significantly lower than MENA at 
10%(*), 5%(**), and 1%(***). 
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Table 5- Investment Climate and Firm Characteristics  
 
* Percentage of firms ranking the variable as a major or severe constraint. Source: World Bank, ICA database, and authors’ 
estimations. 
 
    
MENA 
countries     
NON- 
MENA 
countries   
Ho: No 
difference in 
means 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number 
of Firms Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number 
of Firms [p-values] 
 
       
Size 
127.
1 266.9 3075 
192.
4 555.9 9350 0.0 
Export (% sales) 16.8 34.1 2987 18.7 35.0 8815 0.0 
Foreign ownership (% K) 8.3 25.4 3072 6.2 21.7 9292 0.0 
 
       
Use of e-mail (%  firms) 52.0 50.0 2289 60.5 48.9 8940 0.0 
Use of website (% firms) 26.7 44.2 2550 35.6 47.9 8233 0.0 
Telecommunication* 4.7 21.2 2493 11.4 31.8 8635 0.0 
Electricity* 18.2 38.6 2512 33.2 47.1 8650 0.0 
Transport* 7.6 26.5 2332 15.1 35.8 8634 0.0 
% of firms with generator 22.5 41.8 3040 38.1 48.6 9332 0.0 
 % of electricity from generator 4.8 16.6 2999 7.5 18.7 9110 0.0 
 
       
Overdraft facility (%  firms) 42.6 49.5 3069 56.4 49.6 8519 0.0 
Financing access* 51.5 50.0 2032 34.7 47.6 8492 0.0 
Financing cost* 56.9 49.5 2051 42.0 49.4 8477 0.0 
 
       
Top manager educational level 3.9 1.4 2261 4.3 1.5 8083 0.0 
Top manager experience in firm 
(years) 12.5 10.9 2218 8.0 9.0 8260 0.0 
% of  workers with formal 
training 19.8 39.9 3052 39.8 49.0 9248 0.0 
Availability of skilled workers* 30.1 45.9 2505 24.0 42.7 8625 0.0 
 
       
Labor regulation* 26.9 44.3 2505 21.8 41.3 8430 0.0 
Tax rate* 57.0 49.5 2493 41.8 49.3 8628 0.0 
Tax administration* 38.5 48.7 2486 34.8 47.6 8618 0.0 
License/operating permits* 20.8 40.6 2486 15.5 36.2 8408 0.0 
Customs/trade regulations* 18.4 38.7 2448 24.9 43.2 7844 0.0 
Corruption* 40.6 49.1 2489 44.6 49.7 8635 0.0 
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Table 6 - Estimation Results: Common Model with Individual IC Variables 
Dependent Variable: Value Added (y) 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Textile 
 
 
Leather 
 
 
Garment 
 
 
Agro 
Industry 
 
 
Metal& 
Machinery 
Products 
 
Chemic 
& Pharm 
Products 
 
Wood 
& 
Furniture 
 
Non Metal 
& Plastic 
Materials 
 
ln(l
 
) 0.657 
(16.14)*** 
0.789 
(28.82)*** 
0.735 
(7.12)*** 
0.560 
(13.32)*** 
0.871 
(21.75)*** 
0.540 
(11.09)*** 
0.883 
(18.78)*** 
0.860 
(10.18)*** 
ln(k) 0.321 
(14.61)*** 
0.255 
(14.93)*** 
0.242 
(7.18)*** 
0.395 
(24.64)*** 
0.268 
(13.21)*** 
0.444 
(20.01)*** 
0.235 
(11.28)*** 
0.249 
(8.81)*** 
Size 0.018 
(0.11) 
-0.105 
(0.21) 
-0.092 
(0.48) 
-0.195 
(2.57)** 
0.600 
(0.96) 
-0.193 
(1.92)* 
-0.316 
(1.29) 
0.014 
(0.07) 
Foreign -0.242 
(0.53) 
-0.384 
(0.43) 
-0.011 
(1.30) 
-0.005 
(3.36)*** 
-0.397 
(1.16) 
-0.005 
(1.88)* 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.007 
(1.07) 
Export -0.006 
(1.06) 
-0.183 
(1.43) 
-0.007 
(2.87)*** 
-0.001 
(1.06) 
-0.107 
(0.97) 
-0.005 
(1.64) 
-0.019 
(1.22) 
-0.009 
(1.32) 
RegElect 0.077 
(0.54) 
0.323 
(0.60) 
0.228 
(1.94)* 
0.042 
(0.83) 
1.006 
(1.92)* 
0.053 
(0.86) 
-0.025 
(0.16) 
0.068 
(0.60) 
RegWeb -2.641 
(2.43)** 
2.138 
(1.26) 
0.329 
(0.94) 
-0.426 
(2.07)** 
0.768 
(0.50) 
-0.757 
(3.39)*** 
-1.542 
(1.77)* 
-0.847 
(1.57) 
Cred -1.011 
(2.08)** 
-2.421 
(2.42)** 
-0.403 
(2.74)*** 
-0.144 
(2.38)** 
-1.842 
(2.07)** 
-0.085 
(1.02) 
-0.304 
(1.25) 
-0.554 
(2.26)** 
AccessF 0.006 
(0.11) 
0.118 
(0.65) 
0.059 
(1.41) 
0.044 
(2.34)** 
-0.022 
(0.11) 
0.068 
(2.43)** 
0.126 
(1.74)* 
-0.051 
(1.22) 
Training -0.135 
(0.43) 
0.234 
(0.33) 
-0.142 
(0.93) 
-0.217 
(3.23)*** 
0.428 
(0.56) 
-0.123 
(1.22) 
-0.400 
(1.34) 
-0.103 
(0.59) 
EduM -0.148 
(2.02)** 
-0.282 
(1.53) 
-0.076 
(2.08)** 
-0.064 
(3.03)*** 
-0.673 
(2.61)*** 
-0.073 
(1.96)* 
-0.096 
(1.46) 
-0.158 
(2.84)*** 
ExpM -0.037 
(2.26)** 
0.045 
(1.50) 
-0.000 
(0.05) 
-0.003 
(0.90) 
0.014 
(0.48) 
-0.002 
(0.38) 
-0.006 
(0.56) 
-0.000 
(0.04) 
RegLregul 0.024 
(0.13) 
-0.827 
(1.52) 
-0.069 
(0.50) 
0.007 
(0.10) 
0.362 
(0.70) 
0.020 
(0.20) 
-0.112 
(0.53) 
-0.006 
(0.05) 
RegCorrup 0.081 
(0.51) 
0.074 
(0.17) 
0.168 
(1.53) 
-0.054 
(0.96) 
-0.272 
(0.59) 
-0.008 
(0.11) 
0.073 
(0.52) 
0.124 
(1.40) 
Intercept 1.460 
(2.87)*** 
-2.422 
(1.25) 
1.493 
(2.00)** 
3.388 
(5.45)*** 
-2.612 
(1.34) 
2.358 
(4.94)*** 
1.279 
(1.91)* 
1.568 
(2.66)*** 
Observations 942 380 1601 1494 838 695 774 480 
sigma_u 0.75 1.69 0.77 0.90 1.46 0.75 1.10 0.64 
sigma_v 0.86 0.81 0.54 0.43 0.76 0.46 0.57 0.67 
Wald chi2 1351.4*** 2787.7*** 241.0*** 1306.4*** 2484.5*** 1060.3*** 1321.2*** 300.7*** 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: The one step procedure explains firm-level inefficiency. Variables Size, Foreign, Export, RegWeb, Cred, EduM, ExpM, 
and Training are expected with a negative coefficient; Variables RegElec, AccessF, RegLreg, and RegCorrup with a positive 
coefficient All regressions have been estimated by introducing country-dummy variables at the level of the production 
technology. These dummies are not provided by the table. Significance levels of the coefficients:  *10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses.  Wald chi2 tests do not reject the probability of the statistically significance of 
regressions at the 99% level. Source: World Bank, ICA database, and authors’ estimations. 
. 
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Table 7 - Estimation Results: Common Model with Aggregated IC Variables 
Dependent Variable: Value Added (y) 
 
Independent 
 Variables 
Textile 
 
Leather 
 
Garment 
 
Agro 
Industry 
 
Metal & 
Machinery 
Products 
Chemic 
&Pharm 
Products 
Wood 
& 
Furniture 
Non Metal 
& Plastic 
Materials 
ln(l
 
) 0.637 
(16.01)*** 
0.778 
(27.90)*** 
0.879 
(15.19)*** 
0.551 
(12.54)*** 
0.885 
(25.26)*** 
0.578 
(11.84)*** 
0.836 
(17.87)*** 
0.923 
(15.50)*** 
ln(k) 0.337 
(15.06)*** 
0.252 
(16.57)*** 
0.196 
(7.40)*** 
0.397 
(24.54)*** 
0.258 
(13.11)*** 
0.447 
(20.05)*** 
0.248 
(11.91)*** 
0.254 
(9.31)*** 
Size -0.809 
(1.54) 
-0.333 
(1.77)* 
-0.037 
(0.33) 
-0.212 
(2.75)*** 
-0.159 
(0.22) 
-0.198 
(1.99)** 
-0.490 
(2.22)** 
0.273 
(1.10) 
Foreign -0.426 
(0.90) 
-0.006 
(0.76) 
-0.014 
(0.50) 
-0.005 
(3.48)*** 
-0.541 
(1.05) 
-0.006 
(1.72)* 
0.004 
(0.54) 
-0.019 
(1.28) 
Export -0.016 
(0.81) 
-0.020 
(1.95)* 
-0.078 
(1.81)* 
-0.001 
(1.14) 
-0.114 
(1.04) 
-0.008 
(1.49) 
-0.017 
(1.53) 
-0.186 
(1.08) 
RegInfra 0.762 
(2.52)** 
-0.079 
(0.66) 
-0.057 
(0.95) 
0.014 
(0.27) 
0.833 
(1.83)* 
0.204 
(2.35)** 
0.262 
(1.71)* 
0.318 
(2.32)** 
Human  -0.716 
(1.76)* 
-0.138 
(0.79) 
-0.116 
(1.08) 
-0.253 
(5.03)*** 
-1.174 
(1.52) 
-0.147 
(1.71)* 
-0.488 
(2.33)** 
-0.768 
(2.24)** 
,RegGov -0.259 
(1.21) 
-0.072 
(0.72) 
0.185 
(2.48)** 
-0.047 
(1.48) 
0.706 
(1.70)* 
-0.068 
(1.39) 
-0.060 
(0.54) 
0.136 
(0.86) 
Finance 0.778 
(2.40)** 
0.219 
(1.68)* 
0.035 
(0.50) 
0.124 
(3.86)*** 
0.257 
(0.54) 
0.148 
(2.67)*** 
0.330 
(2.36)** 
-0.208 
(1.26) 
Intercept -0.961 
(0.95) 
0.162 
(0.19) 
0.506 
(1.84)* 
3.243 
(4.82)*** 
-6.121 
(2.83)*** 
1.508 
(2.32)** 
0.703 
(1.04) 
-0.522 
(0.71) 
Observations 929 433 1555 1481 826 741 750 461 
sigma_u 1.31 1.11 0.25 0.91 1.98 0.70 1.10 0.56 
sigma_v 0.86 0.60 0.73 0.37 0.65 0.56 0.53 0.75 
Wald chi2 1579.56 2375.90 925.66 1343.79 3117.04 1010.55 1490.81 893.91 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: The one step procedure explains firm-level inefficiency. The expected sign of the IC aggregated variables is positive for 
RegInfra, RegGov
 
and Finance, and negative for Human (see definition of variables in Annex 2 ). Variables Size, Foreign and Export 
are also expected with a negative coefficient. All regressions have been estimated by introducing country-dummy variables at the level 
of the production technology. These dummies are not provided by the table. * Significance levels of the coefficients:  10%; ** 5%; *** 
1%. Absolute value of z statistics are in parentheses. Wald chi 2 tests do not reject the probability of the statistically significance of 
regressions at the 99% level. Source: World Bank, ICA database, and authors’ estimations. 
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1
 The  Middle East and North Africa (MENA) covers an extensive region, extending from Morocco in northwest 
Africa to Iran in southwest Asia. According to the World Bank, it includes all the Arab Middle East and North Africa 
countries, as well as Iran and Israel (see list in Table A). The population of MENA comprises about 5% of the total 
world population. MENA region generally has an arid and hot climate, with several major rivers providing for 
irrigation to support agriculture in limited areas. Many countries located around the Persian Gulf, along with Algeria 
and Libya, have large quantities of natural gas and crude oil, estimated at 45% and 60% of the world's reserves, 
respectively. As of 2009, 8 of the 12 OPEC nations are within the region. This makes of MENA a strategic area 
economically. But MENA is also a politically, culturally and religiously sensitive region. Economies range from 
very poor (West Bank and Gaza, Yemen), to extremely wealthy nations such as most of the Gulf countries. The 
economic structure of MENA can be different in the sense that, while some nations are heavily dependent on export 
of only oil and oil-related products (Gulf countries, Algeria, Libya), others have a more diverse economic base 
(Egypt, Morocco Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon). It is no coincidence that these countries, which are lacking natural 
resources, are also the “early reformers” in the region and the most integrated in the world economy, as regards 
manufacturing products. 
 
2
 See Nabli. (2007) and  Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2007).  
 
3
 See Nabli. (2007) and  Aysan et al. (2007  and 2009). 
 
4
 See Nabli and Véganzonès–Varoudakis (2004). 
 
5
 See Sekkat and Véganzonès-Varoudakis, (2007).  
 
6
 See Nabli. (2007). 
 
7
 See Aysan et al. (2007); Elbadawi (2002); Serdar Sayan (2009);  the World Bank (2004 and 2009b), as well as the 
World Bank Investment Climate Assessments (ICA) of Egypt (2005 and 2006), Morocco (2001 and 2005), and 
Algeria (2002). 
 
8
 As seen in section 2, firm-level Labor Productivity (LP) is estimated as the ratio of the firms’ Value Added (Y) to 
the Number of Permanent Workers (L). The Value Added is calculated as the difference between “Total Sales” and 
“Total Purchase of Raw Material” (excluding fuel). Various hypotheses can be done regarding the exchange rate that 
is used to convert production and production factors into US dollars. Several exchange rates can be chosen to 
calculate and compare firm-level productivity across countries. In this study, we considered the current market rate 
in US dollars, which has the interest to be the rate that firms use for their economic calculations. This choice, 
however, does not seem to change radically the perception of the firms’ productive performances, the coefficient of 
correlation of the measures of firm-level productivity using alternatively current, constant and PPP exchange rates 
being relatively high. 
 
9
 Results of these estimations are not reported here. They are very similar to the ones obtained when estimating the 
TE (see section VI).  
 
10
 The technology of production explains the Value Added (Y) by the Gross Value of Property, Plant and Equipment 
(K) and the Number of Permanent Workers (L). 
 
11
 Interpretation of results has, however, to be cautious for some countries. This is the case of Lebanon, for which the 
number of observations can be too small (5 for Textile and 16 for Agro-Processing) to reach a reliable conclusion. 
The combination of two surveys for Morocco and Egypt allows more than one hundred observations by branch. 
Morocco, for example, benefits from 500 enterprises in Garments. In Saudi Arabia, the three branches suffer also 
from a relative small number of observations.  
 
12
 See Bosworth and Collins (2003); Rodrik and Subramanian (2004); the World Bank (2003 and 2004). 
 
13
  See in particular Frankel (2002) and Rodrik et al. (2002).  
 
14
 See for example, Acemoglu et al. (2005); Hall and Jones (1999); Knack and Keefer (1995); Rodrik et al. (2002). 
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15
 See Durlauf et al. (2008); Haltiwanger (2002); Pande and Udry (2005); the World Bank (2004), Batra et al. (2003).  
 
16
 a) Infrastructures and Public Services; b) Finance; c) Business-Government Relations; d) Conflict Resolution / 
Legal Environment; e) Crime; f) Learning, Capacity and Innovation; g) Labor Relations. 
 
17
 This axe includes variables from the: c) Business-Government and g) Labor Relation components entering the ICA 
surveys classification. It regroups several dimensions of the most common classification  of the literature testing for 
IC individual variables (ie variables entering the Competition, Taxes, Regulation, Quality of Administration,  and 
Corruption axes, see Annex 2 on the literature)   
 
18
 Human Capacity includes various aspects of the: g) Labor Relation component of the ICA surveys. Although not 
present in the literature on institutions and governance, human capacity constitutes an essential factor of the firm 
productive performance, by stimulating capital formation and raising firm profitability. Because skilled workers are 
better in dealing with changes, a skilled workforce is essential for firms to manage new technologies that require a 
more efficient organizational know-how (see, for example, Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999, and  Bresnahan, et al.  
2002). Human capital is also at the origin of positive externalities (Lucas, 1988, Psacharopoulos, 1988, and Mankiw, 
et al., 1992) and gives as well the opportunity to expand or enter new markets. 
 
19
 See Basto and Nasir (2004); Manly (1994); Mardia, Ken and Bibby, (1997); the World Bank (2003 and 2009b).  
 
20
 See, for example, the rating system elaborated by the International Country Risk Guide, ICRG.  
 
21
 An important question relates to the endogeneity of the IC variables, due to the qualitative nature of investment 
climate factors. This is particularly true for perception variables (such as obstacles to operation) for which firms are 
asked to position their answer on a given scale. The perception of the scale might be different across firms, 
industries, regions and countries. Besides, when answering the questions on their investment climate, firms may be 
influenced by the perception they have of their own productivity and may attribute their inefficiencies to external 
factors. High-performing firms, as well, may be proactive in reducing their investment climate constraints, for 
example by working with the authorities to limit inspections or secure more reliable power supply.   
 
22
 See also Nagaraj et al. (2000), and Mitra et al. (2002) for more developments on methodological aspects. 
 
23
 See also the Investment Climate Assessments (ICA) of Egypt (2005 and 2006), Morocco (2001 and 2005), and 
Algeria (2002).   
 
24
  See Balassa (1978).  
 
25
 See Borensztein, J., J. De Gregorio and J-W. Lee (1998). 
 
26
 The new literature on international trade associates firms’ size with increasing returns to scale, market 
imperfections and product heterogeneity linked to technological innovation. The literature on corporate governance, 
however, describes the difficulties in inciting and controlling big enterprises, although they are more able to reduce 
transaction costs and facilitate economic calculations. Small enterprises are described as less capitalistic and more 
flexible in a volatile environment, in particular in economies characterized by rigidities which encourage the 
development of the informal economy.  
 
27
 The impact of capital is strong in Chemicals & Pharmaceutical Products, Agro-Processing and, to a lesser extent, 
Textile. On the opposite side, the elasticity of labor is high in Metal & Machinery, Non Metal & Plastic Materials, 
Wood & Furniture, Leather, and Garment. These industries appear to be more intensive in labor, although two of 
them (Metal & Machinery and Non Metal & Plastic Materials) are usually considered as applying more capitalistic 
technologies in developed countries. 
 
28
 For Infrastructure, the quality of the electrical network (RegElect) increases firms’ performances in Garment and 
Metal & Machinery Products. It is, however, the access to internet (RegWeb) which emerges as a factor of 
productivity in more industries (Textile, Agro-Processing, Chemical & Pharmaceutical Products and Wood & 
Furniture). As far as Human Capacity is concerned, the level of education of the top manager (EduM) is significant 
in almost all sectors (except Leather and Wood & Furniture), meanwhile the number of years of expertise of 
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Agro-Processing respectively). Same conclusions can be drawn for Financing Constraints, where the access to credit 
line or overdraft facility (Cred) appear to stimulate productivity gains (except in Chemical & Pharmaceutical 
Products and Wood & Furniture), though the qualitative variable of access to financing (AccessF) is significant in 
only three sectors (Agro-Processing, Chemical & Pharmaceutical Products, and Wood & Furniture).  
 
The impact of IC variables can also vary. The access to credit (Cred) seems more detrimental in Leather, Metal & 
Machinery Products and Textile) and the access to the Internet (RegWeb) looks more critical in Textile and Wood & 
Furniture. As for Human Capacity, the education of the top manager (EdM) should be more of a high priority in 
Metal & Machinery Products, Textile and Non Metal & Plastic Materials. 
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